Rene Saran

Headshot of Rene Saran, PhD

Rene Saran, PhD

Associate Professor, Department of Economics

2438 Carl H. Lindner Hall

513-556-1528

Rene Saran, PhD, is an Associate Professor in Economics at the Carl H. Lindner College of Business.

Research Interest
Mechanism Design, Behavioral Economics

Awards | Honors
Organization: Lindner College of Business
Name: Faculty Development Award
Year Received: 2018

Organization: Lindner College of Business
Name: Faculty Development Award
Year Received: 2018

Education
Institution: Brown University
Major: Economics
Completed: 2007
Degree: Ph D

Institution: Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi
Major: Economics
Completed: 2002
Degree: MA

Institution: St Stephen's College, University of Delhi
Major: Economics
Completed: 2000
Degree: BA

Published Contributions
Rene Saran, Norovsambuu Tumennasan, (2019). ELICITING AND AGGREGATING INFORMATION BY SORTITION IN COLLECTIVE CHOICE. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1924-1952.

Geoffroy de Clippel, Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano,  (2019). Level-k Mechanism Design. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1207-1227.

Rene Saran,  (2016). Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 517-564.

Ronald Peeters, Rene Saran, Ayse Yuksel,  (2016). Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's Law. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 729-759.

Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano,  (2014). Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (I):  Fixed and random matching. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 97-111.

Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano,  (2014). Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (II):  2 x 2 games. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 112-123.

Olivier Bochet, Sidartha Gordon, Rene Saran,  (2013). Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 454-459.

Rene Saran, Norovsambuu Tumennasan,  (2013). Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 72-84.

Rene Saran,  (2012). How Naivete improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 311-314.

Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano,  (2012). Regret Matching with Finite Memory. DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS, 160-175.

Rene Saran,  (2011). Bilateral trading with naive traders. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 544-557.

Rene Saran,  (2011). Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1712-1720.

Presentations
Title: $1000 $500 $250 $100 $50 $25 $Other: Designing A Donation Webpage
Organization: Association for Public Economic Theory
Location: Strasbourg, France
Year: 2019

Title: $1000 $500 $250 $100 $50 $25 $Other: Designing A Donation Webpage
Organization: Brown University
Location: Providence, RI, USA
Year: 2019

Title: Eliciting and Aggregating Information by Sortition in Collective Choice
Organization: Seoul National University
Location: Seoul, South Korea
Year: 2018

Title: Level-k Mechanism Design
Organization: HEC Paris
Location: Paris, France
Year: 2018

Title: Using Sortition To Improve Decision-Making in Organizations
Organization: Lindner College of Business
Location: Cincinnati, OH
Year: 2018

Title: Level-k Mechanism Design
Organization: ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich
Location: Zurich, Switzerland
Year: 2017

Title: Level-k Mechanism Design
Organization: Dalhousie University
Location: Halifax, Canada
Year: 2017