Carl H. Lindner College of BusinessCarl H. Lindner College of BusinessUniversity of Cincinnati

Carl H. Lindner College of Business

Rene Saran, PhD

Associate Professor
Professional Summary
Rene Saran
Rene Saran, PhD, is an Associate Professor in Economics at the Carl H. Lindner College of Business.
Contact Information
E-mail:
Office:
327 Carl H. Lindner Hall
Phone:
513-556-1528
Fax:
513-556-6278
Research Interest
  • Mechanism Design, Behavioral Economics
Education

Institution:
Brown University
Major:
Economics
Completed:
2007
Degree:
Ph D


Institution:
Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi
Major:
Economics
Completed:
2002
Degree:
MA


Institution:
St Stephen's College, University of Delhi
Major:
Economics
Completed:
2000
Degree:
BA


Published Contributions

Rene Saran,  (2016). Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 517-564.


Ronald Peeters, Rene Saran, Ayse Yuksel,  (2016). Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's Law. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 729-759.


Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano,  (2014). Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (I): Fixed and random matching. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 97-111.


Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano,  (2014). Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (II): 2 x 2 games. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 112-123.


Olivier Bochet, Sidartha Gordon, Rene Saran,  (2013). Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 454-459.


Rene Saran, Norovsambuu Tumennasan,  (2013). Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 72-84.


Rene Saran,  (2012). How Naivete improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 311-314.


Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano,  (2012). Regret Matching with Finite Memory. DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS, 160-175.


Rene Saran,  (2011). Bilateral trading with naive traders. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 544-557.


Rene Saran,  (2011). Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1712-1720.



Accepted Contributions

Rene Saran, Norovsambuu Tumennasan,  (Accepted). Eliciting and Aggregating Information by Sortition in Collective Choice. ECONOMIC JOURNAL.