Carl H. Lindner College of BusinessCarl H. Lindner College of BusinessUniversity of Cincinnati

Carl H. Lindner College of Business

Iryna Topolyan, PhD

Associate Professor
Professional Summary
Iryna Topolyan is an Assistant Professor in the Economics Department at the Carl H. Lindner College of Business.
Contact Information
E-mail:
Office:
332 Carl H. Lindner
Phone:
513-556-2948
Fax:
513-556-2669
Awards | Honors

Name:
Dean's List of Teaching Excellence
Year Received:
2017


Education

Institution:
Purdue University
Location:
West Lafayette, IN
Major:
Economics
Completed:
2009
Degree:
Ph D


Institution:
Purdue University
Location:
West Lafayette, IN
Major:
Economics
Completed:
2006
Degree:
MS


Institution:
EERC National University, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
Location:
Kyiv, Ukraine
Major:
Economics
Completed:
2005
Degree:
MA


Institution:
Zaporozhye State University
Location:
Ukraine
Major:
Economics
Completed:
2003
Degree:
BS


Published Contributions

Iryna Topolyan,  (2017). Price competition when three are few and four are many. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 175-191.


Subhasish Chowdhury, Iryna Topolyan,  (2016). Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: An application of group all-pay auction. Social Choice and Welfare, 959-971.


Iryna Topolyan, Subir Chakrabarti,  (2016). An extensive-form based poof of the existence of sequential equilibrium. Economic Theory Bulletin, 355-365.


Iryna Topolyan, Xu Xu,  (2016). Differential effects of mother's and child's postnatal WIC participation on breastfeeding. Applied Economics, 2216-2225.


Subhasish Chowdhury, Dongryul Lee, Iryna Topolyan,  (2016). The max-min group contest: weakest-link (group) all-pay auction. Southern Economic Journal, 105-125.


Iryna Topolyan, Qian Wang, Xu Xu,  (2015). Peer effects in breastfeeding. Review of Economics and Finance, 33-44.


Subhasish Chowdhury, Iryna Topolyan,  (2015). The attack-and-defense group contests: best-shot versus weakest-link. Economic Inquiry, 548-557.


Iryna Topolyan,  (2014). • “Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions”. Social Choice and Welfare, 465-476.


Stefano Barbieri, David Malueg, Iryna Topolyan,  (2014). • “Best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information” . Economic Theory, 603-640.


Charalambos Aliprantis, Iryna Topolyan,  (2013). • “Continuity and equilibrium stability”. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 106-110.


Iryna Topolyan,  (2013). • “Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof”. Economic Theory, 697-705.


Charalambos Aliprantis, Iryna Topolyan,  (2011). • “Trembling-hand myopia and trembling-hand perfection”. Economics Letters, 39-41.


Charalambos Aliprantis, Subir Chakrabarti, Iryna Topolyan,  (2009). • “A proof of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic game” . Economics Letters, 261-263.



Accepted Contributions



Research in progress

Title:
A backward assessment characterization of sequential equilibrium and a direct proof of existence


Status:
Writing Results

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
A characterization of sequential equilibrium in games of simple information type





Title:
Competition among hospitals in California


Status:
On-Going

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
Group contests with private information and "weakest link"


Status:
On-Going

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
Negotiated discounts in healthcare: theory and evidence


Status:
On-Going

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
On common belief in future rationality when information sets are not unambiguously ordered


Status:
Writing Results

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
On the role of beliefs about the benefits of breastfeeding


Status:
Writing Results

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
Order-statistics contests


Status:
On-Going

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
Price competition when three are few and four are many


Status:
Writing Results

Research Type:
Scholarly


Title:
Price dispersion with homogeneous goods and informed consumers


Status:
On-Going

Research Type:
Scholarly


Presentations

Title:
Price competition when three are few and four are many
Location:
Faro, Portugal
Year:
2017


Title:
Group contests with private information and the weakest link
Location:
University of East Anglia
Year:
2017


Title:
Price competition when three are few and four are many
Organization:
Southern Economic Association
Location:
Washington, DC
Year:
2016


Title:
A characterization of sequential equilibrium in games of simple information type
Location:
Stony Brook University
Year:
2016


Title:
Discussant for a paper
Organization:
Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth
Location:
Northwestern University
Year:
2016


Title:
“Group contests with private information and the weakest link”
Location:
New Orleans, LA
Year:
2015


Title:
• “The group all-pay auction with heterogeneous impact functions”
Location:
New Orleans, LA
Year:
2015


Title:
“The group all-pay auction with heterogeneous impact functions”
Location:
University of Cambridge
Year:
2015


Title:
“The max-min group contest”
Location:
University of East Anglia
Year:
2015


Title:
“When three are few and four are many”
Location:
Mississippi State University
Year:
2015


Title:
The group all-pay auction with heterogeneous impact functions
Location:
University of Alabama
Year:
2014


Title:
Price dispersion with homogeneous good and informed consumers
Location:
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS
Year:
2014


Title:
Price dispersion with homogeneous good and informed consumers
Location:
IUPUI, Indianapolis, IN
Year:
2014