Weihong Song
Assistant Professor of FinanceProfessional Summary
Weihong Song is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the College of Business. She joined the University of Cincinnati in Fall 2005 after she received her Ph.D. from Boston College. She has an MS in Economics and a BS in Economics from Renmin University of China.
Professor Song's research interests span many areas of empirical and theoretical corporate finance. Her current research focuses on mergers and acquisitions, leverage buyouts, financial advisors, and corporate fraud. Her research works have been published in top tier finance journals such as the Journal of Finance and the Journal of Financial Economics.
Contact Information
Phone:
513-556-7041
Fax:
513-556-0979
Teaching Interest
- corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and investments
Research Interest
- corporate finance, Mergers and Acquisitions, and financial advisors
Organization:
University of Cincinnati
Title:
Assistant Professor of Finance
Organization:
Financial Management Association
Name:
Doctoral Student Consortium
Year Received:
2004
Organization:
Boston College
Name:
Graduate Student Scholarship
Year Received:
2000
Organization:
Renmin University of China
Name:
Excellent Graduate Student Award
Year Received:
1997
Organization:
Bureau of Education of Beijing
Name:
Outstanding Undergraduate Award
Year Received:
1996
Organization:
Renmin University of China
Name:
Excellent Undergraduate Student Award
Year Received:
1993
Organization:
Boston College
Location:
Chestnut Hill, MA
Major:
Finance
Completed:
2005
Degree:
Ph D
Organization:
Renmin University of China
Location:
Beijing, China
Major:
Economics
Completed:
1999
Degree:
MS
Organization:
Renmin University of China
Location:
Beijing, China
Major:
Economics
Completed:
1996
Degree:
BS
Published Contributions
Title:
Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions
Page(s):
179-207
Author(s):
Kisgen, Darren
Qian, Jun
Song, Weihong
Qian, Jun
Song, Weihong
Year Published:
2009
Publisher:
The Journal of Financial Economics
Publicly available:
Yes
Title:
Stock Splits as a Manipulation Tool: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
Page(s):
695-712
Author(s):
Guo, Shourun
Liu, Mark
Song, Weihong
Liu, Mark
Song, Weihong
Year Published:
2008
Publisher:
The Financial Management
Publicly available:
Yes
Research in progress
Title:
Contract Forms in Stock Mergers: Theory and Tests
Status:
On-Going
Research Type:
Scholarly
Title:
Cross-border Mergers and Corporate Governance
Status:
On-Going
Research Type:
Scholarly
Title:
The Impact of a Strategic Regulator on Executive Compensation and Fraudulent Misreporting
Description:
The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 reflects the regulator’s strategic response to an epidemic of corporate fraud in the late 1990s. Recognizing the dynamic interplay between the manager’s decision to commit fraud and the regulator’s decision to investigate the firm, we empirically investigate the shareholder-manager-regulator nexus that determines the equilibrium relationships between the degree of reliance on equity based compensation (EBC), the firm’s growth potential, the extent of fraudulent reporting, and the intensity of fraud detection. Using a sample of recently prosecuted fraud firms collected from SEC litigation releases of the last 10 years and employing the bivariate probit model with partial observability, we find that fraud has mainly been concentrated in high-growth ‘new economy’ industries and fraud has mainly been detected during the recent economic downturn in those industries. Furthermore, greater reliance on EBC increases both the probability of fraud being committed and the conditional probability of detecting fraud. More importantly, greater fraud penalties due to the enactment of SOX reduce both of the probabilities. Using panel regressions, we also find strong evidence that EBC is positively associated with growth potential and negatively associated with fraud penalty in the (relatively fraud-prevalent) high-tech industries, while no such associations exist in the (relatively fraud-free) manufacturing industries. Overall, our empirical results highlight the importance of treating the regulatory agency as a rational player in the fraud commission and detection game. The interaction between the firm manager and the regulator determines the two unobservable probabilities that determine the level of observed fraud. In turn, the firm’s shareholders (or board of directors) rationally incorporate the implied fraud commission and detection probabilities into the optimal equity-based compensation contract awarded to the manager.
Status:
Writing Results
Research Type:
Scholarly
Title:
Does Equity-Based Compensation Really Have a ‘Dark Side’? The Influence of Regulatory Discretion
Location:
Singapore
Year:
2011
Title:
Does Equity-Based Compensation Really Have a ‘Dark Side’? The Influence of Regulatory Discretion
Location:
Wuhan, China
Year:
2011
Title:
Share Repurchases as a Manipulation Tool: Evidence from Insider Trading
Location:
New York, NY
Year:
2010
Title:
Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?
Organization:
Tsinghua University and MIT
Location:
GuangZhou, China
Year:
2009
Title:
The Value of “Boutique” Financial Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions
Location:
Dallas, TX
Year:
2008
Title:
The Impact of a Strategic Regulator on Executive Compensation and Fraudulent Misreporting
Organization:
Finance Management Association
Location:
Dallas, Texas
Year:
2008
Title:
Do Leverage buyouts (Still) Create Value?
Organization:
NBER
Location:
New Paltz, NY
Year:
2008
Title:
Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?
Organization:
NBER
Location:
Cambridge, MA
Year:
2007
Title:
Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?
Location:
Stockholm, Sweden
Year:
2007
Title:
Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions
Location:
Chicago, IL
Year:
2007
Title:
Does Overvaluation Lead to Bad Mergers?
Organization:
American Finance Association
Location:
Chicago, IL
Year:
2007
Title:
Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions
Location:
Zurich, Switzerland
Year:
2006
Title:
Does Overvaluation Lead to Bad Mergers?
Location:
Xi’an, China
Year:
2006
Title:
Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions
Location:
Shanghai, China
Year:
2006
Title:
Does Overvaluation Lead to Bad Mergers?
Organization:
Financial Management Association
Location:
Chicago, IL
Year:
2005
Title:
Stock Splits as a Manipulation Tool: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
Organization:
Financial Management Association
Location:
Chicago, IL
Year:
2005
Title:
Holdups, Renegotiation, and Termination Fees in Mergers
Location:
Portland, OR
Year:
2005
Title:
Does Overvaluation Lead to Bad Mergers?
Location:
Seoul, Korea
Year:
2005
Title:
Does Overvaluation Lead to Bad Mergers?
Location:
Norfolk, VA
Year:
2005
Title:
Holdups, Renegotiation, and Termination Fees in Mergers
Organization:
American Finance Association
Location:
Philadelphia, PA
Year:
2005
Title:
Holdups, Renegotiation, and Termination Fees in Mergers
Location:
Bonaire
Year:
2005
Title:
Holdups, Renegotiation, and Termination Fees in Mergers
Location:
Las Vegas, NV
Year:
2004
Title:
Holdups, Renegotiation, and Termination Fees in Mergers
Organization:
Financial Management Association
Location:
New Orleans, LA
Year:
2004
